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ABSTRACT
This article discusses trademark law’s doctrine of initial interest confusion,
which is currently applied to Internet cases. First, it argues that the doctrine is
problematic because it does not require the traditional showing of likelihood of
confusion, it is superfluous, and it is unnecessary in the Internet context. Second,
it proposes that courts should instead rely on the likelihood of confusion analysis.
Additionally, courts should acknowledge that metatags are an outdated issue, and,
when it comes to domain names, they should make use of the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act (“ACPA”).
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Problem of Initial Interest Confusion
Imagine that you are shopping online for a smartphone, a cell phone that has
the attributes of a computer. You go to Google, but you do not type in “smartphone” because it does not come to mind. Instead, you just type “Blackberry” into
the search engine. Your interest is not in that particular make or model, but that is
the only term that you enter into the search. If the first listing on your results page
displays the website for the iPhone, it is possible that a court would consider that to
be trademark infringement under the initial interest confusion doctrine, even if you
are aware that the iPhone is made by Apple, so you are not confused as to source.
In the United States, federal trademark law is based on the Commerce
Clause 1 and is codified by the Lanham Act. 2 Under the Lanham Act, trademark
infringement is defined by the likelihood of confusion standard. 3 However, some
courts will base a holding of infringement simply on initial interest confusion,
which exists when there is no confusion at the point of sale but rather when the infringing party has gained credibility at the start of the deal or has attracted customers based on the goodwill of the other party. 4
B. Thesis
Initial interest confusion is a doctrine that is flawed because it does not require a showing of likelihood of confusion, it is superfluous and inefficient, and it
is also unnecessary in the Internet context; thus, courts should not utilize it in evaluating trademark infringement. Instead, courts should rely on the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis; in the Internet context, courts should acknowledge
that metatags are an outdated issue and rely on the ACPA for domain names.
1

1 ANNE G ILSON LALONDE, G ILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 1.04 (2004).
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2002).
3
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)(a) (2005) (defining trademark infringement as “likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive”).
4
See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting
that “initial confusion works a sufficient trademark injury”).
2
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C. Overview
Part II of this paper provides a background for understanding initial interest
confusion, 5 and Part III analyzes the problems of initial interest confusion and proposes changes. 6 Part IV provides a summary. 7
II. BACKGROUND
A. Purposes of Trademark Law
Trademark law is based upon various theories that define different purposes:
unfair competition and goodwill, 8 preventing free-riding, 9 and preventing consumer confusion over source. 10 While these concepts are all important, Congress has
codified the last theory into the trademark statute as the basis for infringement.
B. Lanham Act
1. Likelihood of Confusion
Pursuant to section 32 of the Lanham Act, trademark infringement occurs
when there is a likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant—
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of a
registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to
cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark and apply
such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to labels, signs, prints,
packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements intended to be used in commerce
upon or in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of
goods or services on or in connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive. 11

Although the likelihood of confusion standard is not explicitly defined in the
Lanham Act, courts have developed a multifactor test. These factors include the
strength of the mark; the degree of similarity between marks; the proximity of the
goods; the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap and offer the same or
similar goods as the junior user; actual confusion, the defendant’s good faith in

5

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
7
See infra Part IV.
8
See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
9
See Int’l News Serv. v. AP, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
10
See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
11
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2005) (note that this is referred to as “section 32” in trademark
law).
6
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adopting its own mark; the quality of defendant’s product, and the sophistication of
the consumers, plus other possible factors that the court deems relevant. 12 The exact factors vary by circuit.
2. Initial Interest Confusion
In 1962, Congress amended the Lanham Act by deleting the term “purchasers” from defining infringement when the mark is “likely to cause confusion or
mistake or to deceive purchasers as to the source or origin of such goods or services,” 13 so it now includes both actual and potential purchasers. 14 A form of presale
confusion is known as “initial interest confusion.” 15 Even prior to the use of the
term initial interest confusion, courts recognized this doctrine. 16 There are three
ways in which initial interest confusion can arise: (1) the potential consumer may
be diverted to an entity, whether it is a store or website, that he associates with the
owner of the mark; (2) the potential consumer’s ultimate decision to buy the product or service is affected by the person associating the junior and senior users of
the marks; and (3) the potential consumer gives the junior user initial credibility
based on the senior user’s goodwill. 17 This form of confusion is merely based on
initial interest and can arise even if the consumer is not confused when making his
purchase. 18 Some refer to it as a bait-and-switch. 19
A court might choose to recognize initial interest confusion but still emphasize a showing of likelihood of confusion. For instance, in the Third Circuit the
court has highlighted the importance of this traditional standard:
The very language of the Lanham Act leads us to conclude that likelihood of confusion is an essential indicator of whether or not trademark infringement has occurred. Both [sections] 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act, . . . forbid use of words or
marks in a way which is likely to cause confusion as to the origin, sponsorship, or
approval of goods or services. . . . Given this, we decline to read this requirement
out of a case alleging trademark infringement. 20

Despite acknowledging the fundamental nature of likelihood of confusion,
12
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961) (holding that these are
the factors to be considered in assessing likelihood of confusion, but “[e]ven this extensive catalogue
does not exhaust the possibilities”).
13
Lanham Act, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427, 437-38 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 10511127 (2002)).
14
See S. REP. NO. 87-2107 (1962), reprinted in 1962 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2844, 2847 (1962) (explaining
that “purchasers” was deleted because “the provision actually relates to potential purchasers as well as
to actual purchasers”).
15
Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1063 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that “initial interest confusion” is actionable).
16
See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987); Grotrian, Helferrich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975).
17
See BigStar Entm’t, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 207 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (citing Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1063-64 (9th Cir. 1999)).
18
E.g., Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 549 (6th Cir. 2005).
19
Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996) (referring to initial interest confusion as a “‘bait and switch’ of producers”).
20
Century 21 Real Estate Corp. v. LendingTree, Inc., 425 F.3d 211, 221 (3d Cir. 2005).
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the Third Circuit has nonetheless accepted the doctrine of initial interest confusion
in Checkpoint Systems, Inc. v. Check Point Software Technologies, Inc. 21 and has
explicitly held that initial interest confusion is actionable. 22 However, in this case
it was not applicable because there was merely de minimis evidence for initial interest confusion. 23
a. The Development of Initial Interest Confusion
The case generally cited as being the first to use the initial interest confusion
doctrine 24 is Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway &
Sons. 25 The case centered on a German piano maker named Grotrian, Helfferich,
Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. who used the name “Grotrian-Steinweg” on its pianos
and filed for a declaratory judgment holding that this name was not infringing the
name of the “Steinway” pianos by Steinway & Sons. 26 The two companies had a
connection because the Steinway company had been started by Heinrich Steinweg,
who moved from Germany to New York and changed his name to Steinway, and
the German company had been started by his oldest son, C.F. Theodor Steinweg,
who started the Steinweg piano company in Germany. 27 Later, Theodor Steinweg
sold his company and the right to use the name of the business 28 to his employees,
Grotrian, Helfferich, and Schultz, and moved to the United States to be a part of
the Steinway & Sons company. 29 The court held that Steinway’s mark had been
infringed because there was initial interest confusion 30 caused by the name “Grotrian-Steinweg,” which would allow the German company to attract customers by
trading on the reputation of the Steinway brand, despite the high level of customer
sophistication expected of purchasers of expensive goods. 31 The court had other
evidence of infringement, including actual confusion, proximity of the goods due
to direct competition, and similarity of the marks. 32
Another important case in the development of the initial interest doctrine is
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 33 where the defendant company was
named Pegasus Petroleum. The court held that defendant’s name was infringing, in
part due to initial interest within the oil trading business based on the reputation of

21
269 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2001) (a case between the manufacturer of security devices for retail use
and a software company that sells computer firewall technology).
22
Id. at 292.
23
Id. at 298.
24
5 ANNE G ILSON LALONDE, G ILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 5.14 (2007).
25
523 F.2d 1331 (2d Cir. 1975).
26
Id. at 1335.
27
Id. at 1333-34.
28
Id. at 1334. There was a dispute over the assignment of the name, but the court did not address
it on appeal.
29
Id.
30
Id. at 1341-42. The court did not use this exact term, but it did use “initial interest” and “initial
confusion.”
31
Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d
Cir. 1975).
32
See id.
33
818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987).
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Mobil Oil, due to consumers’ associations with the symbol of a Pegasus used by
Mobil Oil. 34 Mobil Oil is a large petroleum corporation that has used the Pegasus
symbol of a flying horse for years in connection with its business and uses it at
most of its gas stations. 35 Pegasus Petroleum is a company that engages in the oil
trading business, which is the bulk buying and selling of petroleum in a market of
about 200 companies, and it did not use the flying horse as a logo. However, Mobil Oil is also a part of the oil trading business, although it did not use the flying
horse symbol in its oil trading work.36 The court arrived at its decision by applying the likelihood of confusion test used in its circuit, known as the Polaroid factors, and almost every factor weighed in favor of the plaintiff. 37 In applying the
factor concerning consumer sophistication, the court determined that despite the
high level of sophistication of purchasers in the oil trading business, there was a
probability that the use of the Pegasus name would create an important trust in the
defendant that was based upon improper association with the plaintiff. 38 Despite
an absence of proof of actual confusion, the court noted that:
Pegasus Petroleum would gain crucial credibility during the initial phases of
a deal. For example, an oil trader might listen to a cold phone call from Pegasus
Petroleum—an admittedly oft used procedure in the oil trading business—when
otherwise he might not, because of the possibility that Pegasus Petroleum is related
to Mobil. 39
A third crucial case in the development of the doctrine is Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 40 in which the court held that the
initial interest confusion doctrine is actionable under the Lanham Act and determined that the use of a competitor’s mark as a metatag41 is likely to cause initial
interest confusion despite a lack of likelihood of confusion as to source. 42 In this
case, the defendant, West Coast, was a large video rental chain, and it used the
term “MovieBuff” as a metatag on its website, which offered a free movie database, after having trademarked the slogan “The Movie Buff’s Movie Store.” 43 The
plaintiff, Brookfield, had trademarked “MovieBuff” for its goods and services as a
computer company that caters to the entertainment industry, offering software and
having a searchable Internet database for subscribers. 44 Evidence showed that a
search for “MovieBuff” would result in a search engine list where the link to West
Coast would be displayed with its domain name “westcoastvideo.com,” and that
the first listing would be the link to Brookfield’s website, so the court determined
34

See id.
Id. at 255.
36
Id. at 256.
37
See id.
38
Id. at 260.
39
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 1987).
40
‘‘174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
41
See Horphag Research Ltd. v. Garcia, 475 F.3d 1029, 1033 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007) (defining a metatag as “an indexing tool used by Internet search engines to determine which websites correspond to the
search terms provided by a user”).
42
Id. at 1063-66.
43
Id. at 1042-43.
44
Id.
35
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that consumers would not be likely to be confused. 45 The court arrived at its conclusion of trademark infringement under the doctrine of initial interest confusion
and explained that this meant that the defendant benefited by misappropriating the
plaintiff’s goodwill by diverting consumers from the Brookfield database for subscribers to the free West Coast database. 46 Thus, the court was able to expand the
doctrine of initial interest confusion to find infringement even in the absence of a
likelihood of confusion.
b. Initial Interest Confusion Not Adopted
The courts in the following cases did not find initial interest to be actionable
because their theory of trademark infringement requires confusion at the time of
sale.
There is disagreement among the courts as to whether to recognize initial interest confusion, and, if so, in what situations it is appropriate. 47 Traditionally, initial interest confusion is not adopted in the First Circuit, 48 although it is occasionally merely avoided. 49 In Fisher Stoves, Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 50
the plaintiff did not expressly use the claim of initial interest confusion, but did
present a case for infringement based on the similar design of the defendant’s
stove. The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that there was no infringement because there was no chance of confusion at the point of sale due to clear labeling of
logos on the front of the stoves. Shortly thereafter, the First Circuit Court of Appeals noted in Astra Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc. 51
that there was no likelihood of confusion since confusion did not affect the final
choice to purchase the computerized blood analyzer machine, despite the machine
being sold under the acronym “ASTRA.” This acronym had no relation to the
pharmaceutical company Astra, which sold products to the same hospitals and other medical purchasers.
More recently, the First Circuit has been more explicit in its resistance to
adopting initial interest confusion, at least in the context of the Internet, as in Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 52 where the defendant’s use of the domain
name “clue.com” for its computer company was not found to infringe on the plaintiff toy company’s trademark for its game because there was no confusion at purchase, and the court noted that it was understandable not to apply initial interest
confusion in such a circumstance. 53 Additionally, in the domain name dispute between Internet financial service companies in CCBN.com, Inc. v. C-call.com,
45

Id. at 1062-63.
Id. at 1062.
47
5 LALONDE, supra note 24, § 5.14.
48
N. Light Tech., Inc. v. N. Lights Club, 97 F. Supp. 2d 96, 113 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2000) (holding
that “initial interest confusion is not cognizable in the First Circuit”); see Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v.
Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1207 (1st Cir. 1983).
49
See, e.g., Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 232 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 2000) (agreeing with the
district court’s refusal “to enter the ‘initial interest confusion’ thicket”).
50
626 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1980).
51
718 F.2d 1201 (1st Cir. 1983).
52
232 F.3d 1.
53
Id. at 2.
46
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Inc., 54 the court held that “de minimus confusion, which is easily resolved, and
does not affect the ultimate purchase decision, is of minimal relevance.”55 Furthermore, in Northern Light Technology v. Northern Lights Club, 56 a case in which
the marks at issue involved the domain name “northernlights.com” versus “Northern Light,” the court held that “temporary initial confusion [is an] insufficient basis
for [an] infringement claim.” 57 Thus, the First Circuit finds initial interest confusion not cognizable in cases involving the Internet, and instead requires that there
be confusion at the time of purchase for there to be infringement.
Additionally, there are instances where other courts have declined to recognize initial interest confusion. Notably, the Fourth Circuit in Lamparello v. Falwell, 58 a case in which a plaintiff was seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement for his website criticizing a famous minister, the court held that “we
have never adopted the initial interest confusion theory; rather, we have followed a
very different mode of analysis, requiring courts to determine whether a likelihood
of confusion exists by ‘examining the allegedly infringing use in the context in
which it is seen by the ordinary consumer.’” 59 Overall, neither the First Circuit
nor the Fourth Circuit has embraced initial interest confusion.
c. Initial Interest Confusion Recognized
Many courts of appeals have held initial interest confusion to be actionable
under the Lanham Act. This form of trademark infringement has been recognized
in the Second, Third, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.60 But even in circuits that do recognize initial interest confusion, this doctrine is employed in different ways depending on the court’s assessment of the importance of the following factors in each case: product relatedness, consumer level of care, the
defendant’s intent to deceive, and the presence of financial benefit to the defendant. Additionally, in the Internet context, there are issues of disclaimers, domain
names, and metatags. Each factor will be discussed in turn.
These factors operate in initial interest confusion cases just as they do as part
of the likelihood of confusion analysis because each is important, but not disposi-

54

73 F. Supp. 2d 106 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1999).
Id. at 113 (citing Alta Vista Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 44 F. Supp. 2d 72, 79 (Mass. Dist. Ct.
1998) (dismissing relevance of incidents of confusion where the confusion “did not run deep” and did
not affect the ultimate purchase or sale)); Lang v. Retirement Living Publ’g Co., Inc., 949 F.2d 576,
583 (2nd Cir. 1991) (finding confusion irrelevant where plaintiff supplied no link between confusion
and eventual purchase decision).
56
97 F. Supp. 2d 96 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2000).
57
Id. at 113 (citing Astra Pharm. Prods., Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 718 F.2d 1201, 1207
(1st Cir. 1983)).
58
420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005).
59
Id. at 316 (citing Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 319 (4th Cir.
1992)); see also What-A-Burger of Va., Inc. v. WHATABURGER, Inc., 357 F.3d 441, 450 (4th Cir.
2004).
60
See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987); Checkpoint
Sys. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2001); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v.
Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998); Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376 (7th Cir.
1996); Brookfield Commc’ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1057 (9th Cir. 1999);
Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228 (10th Cir. 2006).
55
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tive. But in initial interest confusion cases, courts are applying the likelihood of
confusion factors piecemeal, and, if the showing of a factor is not strong, they can
decide, almost by default, that it nonetheless causes initial interest confusion.
Thus, initial interest confusion allows for a finding of infringement by using the
traditional factors in a nonsystematic fashion and without meeting the Lanham Act
standard of likelihood of confusion. Instead, infringement is based upon vague notions of initial credibility gained by the misappropriation of another’s goodwill.
i. Product Relatedness
One factor that courts look at when considering whether there has been initial interest confusion is product relatedness, which exists when the products are
similar, related, or in competition with each other. In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural
Answers, Inc., 61 the Seventh Circuit affirmed the finding of the district court of a
risk of initial interest confusion caused by the defendant’s use of its similar mark
for a similar product, which was an herbal alternative to the plaintiff’s prescription
pharmaceutical drug. 62 The defendant sold a product as part of its alternative
healthcare line of “Herbscriptions” called “Herbrozac,” and other products in the
line included “Herbaspirin” and “Herbadryl.” 63 The “Herbrozac” pills were labeled as a mood elevator that would serve as an alternative to “Prozac.” However,
they differed from the plaintiff’s medications because these pills were available
without a prescription, carried a label with the warning that “this product is not intended to diagnose, treat or cure any disease,” had an herbal odor, and were large
brown pills, unlike the small green and white Prozac pills. 64 Despite these differences, the defendant’s first website used the plaintiff’s mark “Prozac” as a metatag
on its website, but the facts indicate that this did not prove to be useful in increasing traffic to the website because there were too many other websites that had more
references to “Prozac.” 65 In affirming the risk of initial interest confusion, the Seventh Circuit referred to the district court’s reliance on the phonetic similarity of
the marks and the defendant’s use of the metatag “Prozac” on its website. 66
Furthermore, initial interest confusion can be even more straightforward
when the products are not merely related, but where the senior user of the mark
will probably bridge the gap. In Sugar Busters, L.L.C. v. Brennan, 67 the court
noted that “[i]nitial-interest confusion gives the junior user credibility during the
early stages of a transaction and can possibly bar the senior user from consideration by the consumer once the confusion is dissipated.” 68 Here, initial interest confusion played a part in the court’s enjoining further sales by the defendant after the
defendant used the book title “Sugar Bust for Life,” which competed with the

61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68

233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000).
See id.
Id. at 460.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 464.
No. 98-1562, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15280 (E.D. La. Sept. 22, 1998).
Id. at *16-17 (quoting Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 201 (5th Cir. 1998)).
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plaintiff’s bestselling book titled “Sugar Busters! Cut Sugar to Trim Fat.” 69 The
defendant’s book gave diet advice and recipes based on the concepts covered in the
plaintiff’s book, and the court determined that the plaintiff would naturally expand
into selling its own cookbook. 70
Additionally, a court can find that there is no initial interest confusion when
there is no overlap in the markets for the products. In Checkpoint Systems, Inc. v.
Check Point Software Technologies, Inc., 71 the court addressed initial interest confusion and determined that in the case of a plaintiff security device manufacturer
and a defendant software installer of computer network security programs, there
was merely de minimis initial interest confusion where the markets for these products did not overlap. 72 The plaintiff, Checkpoint Systems, Inc., had used the
“Checkpoint” mark in sales of its security products designed to track the location
of goods to retailers to prevent store theft. 73 The defendant, Check Point Software
Technologies, Inc., sells firewall programs to protect a purchaser’s computer network. 74 The court held that product relatedness is one of the relevant factors in
initial interest confusion because there is more likely to be a wrongful acquisition
of goodwill when the products are similar; without which, there is a less likelihood
of free-riding. 75
Even when the products are related, a court can determine that there is no
initial interest confusion. One example is the decision in Inc. Publishing Corp. v.
Manhattan Magazine, Inc., 76 where the court noted that a theory of initial interest
confusion, referred to as a situation that would allow a competitor to get a “foot in
the door,” was unproved in the context of the use of similar marks by publishers
for magazines. 77 The plaintiff was the owner and publisher of “Inc.” magazine, in
publication since 1979, and the defendant was the owner and publisher of “Manhattan, Inc.” magazine, which began publication in 1984. 78 The court characterized the notion of a competitor getting a “foot in the door.” 79 The testimony of

69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

See id.
Id. at *14.
269 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 2001).
See id.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 296-97.
‘616 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).’
Id. at 387.
Id. at 372-73.
Id. at 387. The court stated:
An alternative form of potential confusion among advertisers, suggested by certain of plaintiffs’ witnesses, may be characterized as the “foot in the door” or
“fraudulent entry” phenomenon. The scenario goes like this. An ad salesman for
“Manhattan, [I]nc.” makes an unsolicited telephone call to a prospect at an advertising agency. “I’m from ‘Manhattan, [I]nc.,’” he says, deliberately (or by inadvertence) slurring the “Manhattan” and stressing the “inc.” The agency man believes that the salesman is from “Inc.” magazine, and because of its fine
reputation, he grants an interview. Of course, the truth will emerge soon enough
during the interview; but the salesman has gotten his foot in the door, and is thus
able to make his spiel.
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witnesses for the defendant was found to be convincing: that a publisher would
emphasize its prior success in publishing other magazines when making sales presentations to advertising agencies. 80 Thus, the suggestion that the defendant would
be able to rely on initial interest confusion 81 was deemed to be counter to the evidence presented, despite product relatedness. 82
However, initial interest confusion can also be found in the absence of relatedness or competition. For instance, in Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 83 the court held that the initial interest confusion caused by the use of
the mark “Polo” as the title of a magazine served as evidence of actual confusion
with the fashion mark “Polo” used by Ralph Lauren. 84 One type of proof of initial
interest confusion that the court noted was actual confusion by potential customers. 85 Some incidents detailed in deposition testimony included subscribers of the
magazine thinking that the mark was associated with Ralph Lauren. 86 Additionally, some potential advertisers believed the magazine was affiliated with the fashion
company, although this was not to the benefit of the magazine when other clothing
companies did not want to advertise. 87 Furthermore, there were survey results that
tested to see if people were confused about the affiliation of the magazine that
were reported as well, but these surveys created difficulties because there were issues of whether the questions asked were proper, whether the test group was appropriate, and whether the assessment of the data of those surveys was correct. 88
Rather than deciding how much importance to give the survey evidence, the court
instead relied on the showing of initial interest confusion and stated that even if the
perceived affiliation between the magazine and Ralph Lauren was fleeting, it was
sufficient to establish actual confusion. 89
ii. Consumer Sophistication
Consumer sophistication is a factor that addresses the level of care the relevant consumer market gives to its purchase, and goods and services that are more
costly are considered to require a higher level of sophistication. As in the likelihood of confusion standard, a high level of consumer sophistication can serve as a
mitigating factor and make initial interest confusion unlikely. One such case is
Rust Environment & Infrastructure v. Teunissen, 90 where the plaintiff sought to
prohibit the defendants from using “Donohue & Associates” as the name of their

Id.
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
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Id.
The court did not use this term in the case.
Inc. Publ’g Corp., 616 F. Supp. at 387.
103 F. Supp. 2d 935 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
See id.
Id. at 968.
Id. at 969.
Id. at 970.
See id. at 965-68.
Westchester Media Co. v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 103 F. Supp. 2d 935, 972 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
‘131 F.3d 1210 (7th Cir. 1997).
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wastewater engineering consulting firm. 91 Originally, the “Donohue” mark had
been used for a nationally-known engineering firm practicing in the area of wastewater engineering, which was then acquired by Waste Management, and Waste
Management went on to use the “Donohue” mark until 1993 when it switched to
the name “Rust Environment & Infrastructure” (“Rust”). 92 The defendants, who
were former employees of Rust, formed a second engineering consulting firm and
called it “Donohue & Associates” (“Donohue II”), even though none of them had
the name Donohue. 93 The court affirmed the district court’s holding that initial
interest confusion, in terms of making initial contacts and getting their foot in the
door, was unlikely due to the high level of sophistication of Donohue II customers,
the small wastewater engineering market, and the high cost of their projects. 94 The
court also acknowledged that the employees of Donohue II were careful to introduce themselves as a new firm. 95
But, as with the likelihood of confusion standard, a high level of sophistication of the relevant consumer class does not necessarily prevent initial interest confusion. For instance, in SecuraComm Consulting, Inc. v. SecuraCom Inc., 96 the
court enjoined the defendant’s use of the mark “SecuraCom,” which was used for a
security systems consulting firm, while the plaintiff had been using the mark “SecuraComm” for its own competing security systems consulting firm. 97 The security systems consulting business involves competitive bidding on contracts, which
can take place over several months. 98 By the time a purchaser finalizes a contract,
it is clear which company is involved, so the defendants argued that confusion between the companies is not possible. 99 However, the court disagreed and held that
confusion is possible under the doctrine of initial interest confusion. 100 The defendants made an additional argument to explain why confusion is not likely, based on
the sophistication of the consumers. 101 Because initial interest confusion is not dependent upon actual sales, the court considered the high level of care of the consumer in making his or her purchase to be a factor that is generally trumped by a
showing of initial interest. 102 Here, it seems the similarity of the marks would
have been sufficient for a finding of infringement under the likelihood of confusion
standard. 103
However, a high level of sophistication of the relevant consumer market can
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See id.
Id. at 1212-13.
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Id. at 1213.
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Id. at 1217.
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Id.
96
984 F. Supp. 286 (D.N.J. 1997).
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See id.
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Id. at 298
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Id.
100
Id. at 299.
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Id.
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SecuraComm Consulting, Inc. v. SecuraCom Inc., 984 F. Supp. 286, 299 (D.N.J. 1997) (citing 3
J.T. MCCARTHY, MC CARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23:6 (4th ed. 1997)).
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See id.
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be an aggravating factor to initial interest confusion. One such case is Lois
Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 where the court determined that
the sophistication of the purchasers of designer blue jeans would add to a finding
of initial interest confusion, after a company used a substantially similar stitching
pattern on the back pocket as a famous manufacturer’s registered trademark for a
pocket stitching pattern. 105 The court looked at the likelihood of confusion factors,
and, when it examined the factor of sophistication of the relevant consumers, it determined that this factor favored the famous manufacturer Levi Strauss because the
more sophisticated buyer is more likely to assume that there is an affiliation between the Levi Strauss jeans stitching pattern and the competitor.106 The sophisticated consumer is the one who is going to notice the stitching patterns in the first
place. 107 While the sophistication of the consumer is often a basis for disputing
confusion, in this situation it aided the case of Levi Strauss against the junior user
of its trademarked pattern, just as in Grotrian. 108
iii. Defendant’s Intent to Deceive
An intent to deceive by the defendant generally will be an aggravating factor
that goes towards initial interest confusion and operates the same as the factor of
defendant’s bad faith in the likelihood of confusion analysis. In Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp., 109 the court held that the
purposeful use of an entertainment company’s mark “MovieBuff” in the domain
name and metatags of a video rental chain store likely caused initial interest confusion. 110 The court emphasized that the defendant acted affirmatively when it used
the plaintiff’s mark, so it generated the initial interest confusion, rather than simply
taking advantage of a fluke situation as in other cases where the junior user coincidentally used the senior user’s mark. 111
iv. Financial Benefit to Defendant
When there is no financial benefit to the defendant, it is harder to find initial
interest confusion as evidenced in Northland Insurance Companies v. Blaylock,112
where the court held that there was no initial interest confusion by a gripe site113
that used the mark of an insurance company in its domain name. 114 Because the
case involved a gripe site, it seems the court could have simply hinged its analysis
104

799 F.2d 867, 876 (2d Cir. 1986).
See id.
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Id. at 875.
107
Id.
108
See Grotrian, Helferrich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331 (2d
Cir. 1975).
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‘‘174 F.3d 1036, 1065 (9th Cir. 1999).
110
See id.
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Id. at 1065.
112
115 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Minn. 2000).
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See 2 ANNE G ILSON LALONDE, G ILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 7A.06 (2007) (defining gripe sites
as “criticism . . . sites (also known as ‘sucks’ sites because they are often in the form
brandXsucks.com)” ).
114
See Northland, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108.
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on “fair use.” In this case, the defendant owned a yacht insured by the plaintiff insurance company. 115 After the yacht was damaged, the defendant did not collect
the full amount of damages he sought, so he created a website to share his experience and criticize the company. 116 The court held that initial interest confusion
occurs when a defendant, who used a plaintiff’s mark, did so to attract consumers
in order to gain financially. 117 In this case, the defendant had used the plaintiff insurance company’s mark to draw attention to his criticism of that company, which,
as the court phrased it, was within the bait-and-switch construct of initial interest
confusion, in that there is “‘bait’ . . . [but] there is no discernable ‘switch’” because
the defendant did not stand to reap any material gain. 118 While the plaintiff did
contend that the defendant could gain by harming the plaintiff’s ability to do business online, the court noted that it did not have enough facts to support that assertion and instead concluded that initial interest confusion did not apply to the
case. 119 Thus, the lack of financial benefit to the defendant is an important factor
that can indicate the absence of initial interest confusion, but courts could instead
look to fair use to protect gripe sites and other expressions of free speech.
v. Internet Context
a.) Disclaimers
A disclaimer could be ineffective to prevent initial interest confusion, as
demonstrated in Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. v. Bucci, 120
where the plaintiff, the nonprofit Planned Parenthood, was granted a preliminary
injunction to enjoin the defendant, a pro-life host of a daily radio show, from using
its mark in his website domain name “plannedparenthood.com.” 121 The plaintiff
had used its mark since 1942, and it has its own website with the domain name
“ppfa.org,” while the defendant had registered to use his website domain name in
1996, and the content of the website provides information about an anti-abortion
book. 122 The court held that a disclaimer on the defendant’s website would not
remedy its finding of a likelihood of confusion because readers of the website
would still have to spend time and energy accessing the site before they understood
that it was not affiliated with the plaintiff. 123 Thus, the court placed a high value
on the small investment an Internet user makes merely in visiting a website and in
the short amount of time it takes to ascertain that it is unrelated to his or her intended search.
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Id. at 1114.
Id.
Id. at 1120.
Id.
Id. at 1121.
‘1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
Id.
Id. at *2-4.
Id. at *38.
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b.) Domain Names
A domain name can be the basis of actionable initial interest confusion. For
example, in Ty, Inc. v. Agnes M., Ltd., 124 the court found that it was a genuine issue of fact whether there was initial interest confusion over the plaintiff’s mark
“Beanie Babies” for bean bag toys, and the defendant’s website called “beaniebabes.com” where she sold both Beanie Babies and other similar toys. 125 While
more evidence would be needed in order to establish initial interest confusion, the
court did note that the defendant’s website used the plaintiff’s logo in addition to
using a domain name very similar to the plaintiff’s mark, so it was possible that
Internet users could initially be misled and this would allow the defendant to “get
its foot in the door,” which gave the plaintiff a strong argument on this issue. 126
Additionally, disputes over domain names can be resolved under the Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy, in which one of the dispute providers is the World
Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”), 127 where recently there have been a
number of decisions involving pharmaceutical trademarks, such as those involving
the medication Acomplia. 128 The Sanofi-aventis pharmaceutical company owns
the weight-loss drug Acomplia, which is available in the United Kingdom and
Germany. 129 One recent complaint filed by Sanofi-aventis against the holder of
the domain names “www.acompliablog.com” and “www.genericacomplia.net” resulted in the WIPO Arbitration and Mediation Center’s decision to cancel these
domain names. 130 The panel noted that an Internet user might not specifically
search for these particular domain names, but they could nonetheless be listed in
search results for Acomplia when users are looking for the pharmaceutical company’s website, and that this is the intent of the respondent; thus, the respondent is
misappropriating the complainant’s mark to attract visitors, which causes initial
interest confusion. 131 The use of the word “generic” in “www.genericacomplia
.com” conjures up the notion of low-cost medication, and the use of the word
“blog” in “www.acompliablog.com” would lead one to believe that he or she
would receive extra information, so these additional words do not help the respondent avoid initial interest confusion. 132
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c.) Metatags
Although search engines generally do not use metatags in their relevancy algorithms, 133 they can be a source of actionable initial interest confusion, as shown
in Promatek Industries, Ltd. v. Equitrac Corp., 134 where the defendant used plaintiff’s mark “Copitrak” as a metatag on its website, because even though the defendant was a competing company it was also in the business of repairing the plaintiff’s brand of cost-recovery equipment. 135 The court noted that there was a
likelihood of initial consumer confusion 136 and affirmed the grant of a preliminary
injunction against the defendant’s use of the metatag because there was a strong
likelihood of confusion. 137 The court explained that initial interest confusion is
actionable, even if the duration of confusion is short and no longer exists at the
time of purchase, because it misappropriates the senior user’s goodwill. 138 Furthermore, the court clarified that the problem was not the use of plaintiff’s mark by
the defendant as a metatag, but “that it used that trademark in a way calculated to
deceive consumers into thinking that [defendant] was [the plaintiff].” 139 Thus, infringing use of another’s trademark as a metatag can depend on deception and not
mere use.
However, the use of another company’s metatag on one’s website is permitted when it is found to be a fair use. One such example is Playboy Enterprises,
Inc. v. Terri Welles, Inc., 140 where the court held that the use of the marks “Playboy” and “Playmate” by a former Playboy model in the metatag keywords on her
website were a nominative fair use because they allowed her, in good faith, to indicate the content of the website. 141 However, some initial interest confusion was
demonstrated by circumstantial evidence, including the deposition of an expert
witness, that there were Internet users who used the marks at issue as search terms
in their web browser when they were actually looking for the official website of
the magazine. 142 Despite this evidence, the court emphasized that there was no
proof that the use of the metatags was to divert customers or to misappropriate
goodwill. 143 Additionally, use of these trademarks as metatags “comports with the
fact web users must utilize identifying words to find their intended site,” 144 and the
“policies of free competition and free use of language dictate that trademark law

133
Zachary J. Zweihorn, Note, Searching for Confusion: The Initial Interest Confusion Doctrine
and its Misapplication to Search Engine Sponsored Links, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1343, 1362-63 (2006)
(explaining that search engines generally do not use metatags in their relevancy algorithms).
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300 F.3d 808, 810-11 (7th Cir. 2002).
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Id. at 813.
137
Id. at 814.
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Id. at 814 (citing Ty, Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc., 132 F.3d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir. 1997)); see
Brookfield Commc’ns v. W. Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1066 (9th Cir. 1999).
140
78 F. Supp. 2d 1066, 1095 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
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cannot forbid the commercial use of terms in their descriptive sense.” 145 Therefore, fair use of a trademark, including a trademark as a metatag, can prevent a
finding of infringement by initial interest confusion, just as with the likelihood
standard.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Problems of Initial Interest Confusion
Initial interest confusion is a flawed doctrine because it does not require a
showing of likelihood of confusion, it is superfluous and inefficient, and it is also
unnecessary in the Internet context, so courts should not utilize it in evaluating
trademark infringement.
1. No Requirement of Likelihood of Confusion
Since initial interest confusion does not necessarily require there to be a likelihood of confusion, which is the basis of trademark law, it improperly broadens
findings of infringement and limits consumer access to legitimate information in
the marketplace.
The likelihood of confusion standard is better than initial interest confusion
because it is the statutory basis of infringement codified by Congress in the Lanham Act. 146 The Act is not based upon mere diversion or distraction of consumers
– there should be no infringement where the potential consumer is not likely to be
confused. 147 However, initial interest confusion does not follow this logic because, after Brookfield, this doctrine is able to establish infringement even in the
absence of a likelihood of confusion. 148 Other scholars, such as Dogan and Lemley, as well as Rothman, have been similarly critical of the analysis applied in
Brookfield. 149 While some argue that the Brookfield-type analysis is appropriate in
certain contexts, such as the Internet cases, 150 the need to limit the usage of the
doctrine to specific circumstances, especially when the relevant technology is constantly changing, demonstrates that initial interest confusion has an inherently
145
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limiting circumstances of application online).
146

32

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW

Vol. III:I

weak foundation. However, while some argue that initial interest confusion is appropriate because it is a subset of likelihood of confusion 151 or that it fits within the
traditional analysis, 152 this is inconsistent with the current state of the doctrine because the traditional standard is incapable of finding infringement when there is no
likelihood of confusion.
While the other foundational principles of trademark are also important, a
doctrine of infringement in this area of law should be governed by likelihood of
confusion and not unfair competition. Unfair competition and the misappropriation of goodwill are crucial components in trademark law, but some courts have
taken them too far and are improperly limiting consumer access to legitimate comparative information in the marketplace via initial interest confusion. While
trademark law does prevent unfair competition, 153 the emphasis should be on the
word “unfair” because fair competition is permitted. 154 However, initial interest
confusion has been used to limit appropriate competition, as in Promatek, 155 where
the use of a competitor’s trademark in a website metatag was enjoined even though
the website owner also serviced the competitor’s brand of equipment. Without the
doctrine of initial interest confusion, a court could have determined that the use of
the metatag was fair because it informed consumers of a legitimate activity. While
it has been argued that allowing the use of another’s trademark, even in the absence of confusion, would permit free-riding and the misappropriation of goodwill, 156 this argument is unsupportable because it would mean that it is trademark
infringement for consumers to be informed of competing brands, and, by implication, stores would be unable to place competing brand-name goods next to one
another. 157 Even in the Internet context, online retailers are allowed to suggest alternatives to consumers prior to purchase. 158 Thus, the doctrine of initial interest
confusion deprives consumers of important fair competition information for comparison shopping.
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Chad J. Doellinger, Trademarks, Metatags and Initial Interest Confusion: A Look into the Past
to Reconceptualize the Future, 41 IDEA 173, 196 (2001) (noting that initial interest confusion is “best
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part of the likelihood of confusion test).
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See Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403 (1916).
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2. Initial Interest Confusion is Superfluous
Courts that utilize the doctrine of initial interest confusion generally evaluate
the same factors in making a determination of infringement as they would when
applying the traditional likelihood of confusion standard, so initial interest confusion is superfluous and inefficient.
For instance, in Pegasus Petroleum, the court applied the likelihood of confusion factors and determined that they favored the plaintiff, and thus did not require the initial interest doctrine to arrive at its ruling. 159 As at least one scholar
has already noted in the Internet context, but which applies to the brick-and-mortar
world as well, trademark’s traditional likelihood of confusion standard is sufficient
and initial interest confusion is not needed. 160 When the court applied initial interest confusion in explaining that Pegasus Petroleum could gain “crucial credibility
during the initial phases of the deal,” it did so within the context of analyzing the
likelihood of confusion factor of purchaser sophistication,161 which indicates that
the doctrine is not independent of the traditional analysis.
Furthermore, other cases demonstrate that the courts are applying the same
or similar factors that are applied in the likelihood of confusion test when they use
initial interest confusion. As we have seen, courts using the initial interest doctrine
look at factors such as product relatedness (proximity), consumer sophistication,
the defendant’s intent to deceive, and financial benefit to the defendant—all of
which are factors that courts already look at in applying the traditional likelihood
of confusion test. Even proponents of initial interest confusion acknowledge that
the traditional factors are the basis or the framework for the doctrine. 162
Additionally, the doctrine of initial interest confusion can cause courts to be
less efficient by taking their attention away from the substance of the confusion
factors. For example, in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 163 the defendant
had used a similar mark for a similar product that was an herbal alternative to the
prescription medication made by the plaintiff. 164 While the court had the factors of
similarity and proximity upon which to base its analysis, it still went on a tangent
of analyzing the initial interest confusion due to the metatag, but on the facts of the
case the metatag did not even attract traffic to the defendant’s website. 165 There
may be valid concerns about cases such as this one, which involve pharmaceuticals, and it could be argued that initial interest confusion is doing more than pre-

159

See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987).
Jason Allen Cody, Note, Initial Interest Confusion: What Ever Happened to Traditional Likelihood of Confusion Analysis?, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 643 (2002) (arguing that the adoption of the initial
interest confusion doctrine is unwarranted in the Internet context).
161
Mobil Oil Corp., 818 F.2d at 259.
162
Doellinger, supra note 151, at 198-99 (using the traditional likelihood of confusion test as a
basis for the initial interest confusion doctrine); see also Maynard, supra note 152, at 1352 (noting that
initial interest confusion is a part of the traditional likelihood of confusion standard). But see Posner,
supra note 150, at 443-44 (advising the adoption of initial interest confusion using Brookfield, a case
that did not apply the traditional likelihood of confusion factors).
163
See 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000).
164
Id.
165
Id. at 460.
160

34

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW

Vol. III:I

venting the misappropriation of goodwill and is also protecting consumer health.
The same concern would also arise in WIPO decisions addressing pharmaceutical
marks used in domain names by entities that are not associated with the manufacturer. 166 However, as Lemley has argued when discussing the externalities of
trademarks, “[a]s long as any confusion is dispelled by the time consumers buy
goods or services, as initial interest confusion assumes, consumers may be presumed to have found the alternative goods at least as desirable as the mark owners’
goods.” 167 In Natural Answers, the consumer could legitimately be searching for
herbal alternatives. Thus, because initial interest confusion is based on the notion
that the consumer is not confused about the source of the goods at the time of purchase, courts addressing such cases could put more weight on the factor of consumer sophistication as a protective mechanism for the sake of public health and
safety.
3. Internet Context
In the Internet context, initial interest confusion is obsolete due to search engine technology for metatags and statute for domain names.
a.) Metatags
In Brookfield, the court created an analogy based upon a highway billboard
sign to help explain how initial interest confusion relates to metatags. 168 However,
this analogy does not help to support the doctrine of initial interest confusion because it does not accurately reflect how metatags work, since metatags are not seen
by consumers, and because it fails to consider the ease and simplicity of searching
the Internet. Clicking back to a prior webpage is a low-cost activity, unlike the
trouble it would take to go back to the highway. 169 Judge Berzon, who noted that
the Brookfield billboard example has been widely criticized, 170 offered a more realistic analogy and stated that a metatag that uses another’s trademark is like the situation faced by a person who goes shopping at a store to buy a certain brand-name
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See, e.g., Sanofi-aventis v. World Wide Web, Inc., No. D2008-0459 (WIPO Arb. & Mediation
Ctr. May 21, 2008).
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item and on the way sees the store-brand alternative; even when the consumer purchases the store-brand alternative, there is no initial confusion or infringement.171
Additionally, it is not infringement for online retailers, such as Amazon.com, to
show the Internet consumer pictures of goods he or she might consider based upon
his or her search for a brand-name item. 172 Furthermore, the issue of metatags is
outdated because Google and other search engines do not use them to reach their
search results. 173 Thus, the Brookfield analogy is incorrect, and the overall issue of
metatags causing initial interest confusion is generally obsolete.
However, metatags continue to be the basis for infringement suits, and we
can use them to represent not only current but also future Internet technologies that
manipulate search results online. These are nothing new; rather, they are paid
promotions that are customary in brick-and-mortar stores, for instance the grocery
store practice of accepting “slotting allowances” from corporations that want their
product to have prime shelf space. 174 So long as there is no likely confusion of the
relevant consumer, these practices should continue to be accepted as promotional
devices.
b.) Domain Names
The application of initial interest confusion to domain names is unnecessary
because domain names are protected by the ACPA, 175 passed by Congress in 1999,
which provides a remedy for situations where the defendant used the plaintiff’s
same or confusingly similar mark in a domain name and acted with a bad faith intent to profit from the goodwill of the plaintiff. 176 In WIPO decisions, where the
ACPA is not applied, the likelihood of confusion standard is the analysis used to
decide whether a domain name that uses another’s mark is infringing, and initial
interest confusion is briefly mentioned at the end without further analysis, which
helps demonstrate that initial interest confusion is unnecessary. 177 In the Internet
context, the ACPA is better than the likelihood of confusion standard, due to the
difficulty of assessing the factor of consumer sophistication, since it is difficult to
know whether Internet users are using a high degree of care due to their familiarity
with how search engines work,178 or whether most users are not using a high de-
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gree of care due to the widespread use of the Internet and the low cost of clicking
back to the prior webpage. 179 But note that in cases involving public health, the
risks associated with any confusion are high, so in that context a thorough assessment of consumer sophistication is justified. Another reason not to use initial interest confusion is that users who search for a particular trademark in a search engine will then see the search list and have a brief description of the page to judge
whether to click on the link or not. 180 Just as the use of initial interest confusion is
obsolete for metatags, it is also outdated for domain names.
c.) Internet Future
The arguments favoring initial interest confusion – the gaining of initial credibility and attracting consumers by another’s goodwill – are not always relevant
in the Internet context because people use brand names to search for goods without
knowing or remembering the generic term. When the potential consumer intends
to find a smartphone and searches for one by using the search term “Blackberry,”
then it should be acceptable for “iPhone” to show up in the results, too. After all,
the consumer did not intend on a particular brand, he or she simply is looking for a
product and used a brand as a search term out of convenience. But, what about
when the consumer does intend to find “Blackberry?” Even then, it should be
okay for other brands to show up in the search engine results listing because
“iPhone” and others are merely alternatives, and the customer is simply offered a
fair choice. 181 It should not be infringement for future technology to use brands as
representative of generic goods:
1st.) Internet consumer
enters “Blackberry” Æ

2nd.)”Blackberry” triggers all results for
“smartphone”:
3rd.) The search engine result list then
shows:
-Blackberry
-iPhone
-etc.

Not only should it be acceptable for the search of “Blackberry” to turn up results for “iPhone” and others, with the understanding that a consumer may not be
actually looking for “Blackberry” or may want to be presented with alternatives, it
should also be fair to manipulate the order of the listings, just like paid promotions
or grocery store “slotting allowances.” So long as the consumer is not likely to be
confused, this would be consistent with brick-and-mortar practices, it offers buyers
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 209, 223 (2005) (citing Todd B. Patterson & Peter L. Brewer, “Initial Interest
Confusion” Factors into Infringement Analysis, N.J.L.J., Mar. 11, 2002, at 31 (noting that initial interest confusion could improperly underestimate the intelligence of online consumers, while trademark
law is based upon the person of average intelligence)).
179
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180
2 JEROME GILSON ET AL., TRADEMARK PROTECTION AND PRACTICE § 7A.08 (2002).
181
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1035 (9th Cir. 2004) (Berzon, J., concurring) (noting that Amazon.com is allowed to offer its consumers alternate options prior to
sale).
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legitimate information, and it acknowledges the practice of the Internet search that
intends to find alternative brands and options.
This approach would also incentivize sellers to educate consumers on the
generic terms, 182 (which would encourage “smartphone” as a search term for those
not seeking a particular brand) as well as educate consumers on manipulative Internet practices. The brick-and-mortar shopper is already aware of the concept of
paid promotions, and the Internet consumer has the right to be similarly aware.
One caveat is that the brand of the consumer’s search should appear in the top five
results, or at least on the first page of the results, so that the relevant Internet consumer can find it without having to flip through an unreasonable number of manipulated search results.
B. Proposal
For the foregoing reasons outlined in Part III.A, courts should abolish the initial interest confusion doctrine and instead rely on the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis. Concern for public health and safety should be addressed by emphasizing the factor of consumer sophistication. In the Internet context, courts
should acknowledge that metatags are an outdated issue and rely on the ACPA for
domain names. In the future, courts should permit manipulative Internet search
practices so long as those practices do not lead to a likelihood of confusion of the
relevant Internet consumer, which will incentivize sellers to educate consumers
about such practices.
C. Examples
There are a number of cases that have applied both the initial interest confusion doctrine as well as the traditional likelihood of confusion standard, for which
the traditional standard would have been sufficient to reach the same rulings. This
includes one of the first initial interest confusion cases, Grotrian, because the court
considered likelihood of confusion factors, such as evidence of actual confusion,
proximity of the goods due to direct competition, and similarity of the marks.183
Because these factors weighed in favor of the plaintiff, the court could have
reached its same conclusion without ever referencing initial interest confusion.
The Pegasus Petroleum court actually arrived at its conclusion by examining the
traditional likelihood of confusion factors, 184 and, because almost each one
weighed in favor of the plaintiff, the traditional test would have been sufficient,
making the mention of initial interest confusion extraneous. Similarly, recent
pharmaceutical cases heard by WIPO have applied the likelihood of confusion
standard and merely mentioned initial interest confusion without further analy-
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See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (implying that the seller should
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sis. 185 These cases have all analyzed the factors from the traditional standard and
would have reached the same outcomes without the doctrine of initial interest confusion since this doctrine did not alter their decision. Furthermore, because they
involved medications, these decisions should emphasize consumer sophistication
in the likelihood of confusion balancing test. If the relevant Internet consumers
searching for medicines have a lower level of sophistication/level of care, then a
court should arrive at a conclusion of infringement if there is a probability of confusion, even when the other factors weigh in favor of the defendant.
On the other hand, the Brookfield court acknowledged that there was no likelihood of confusion, 186 so the traditional standard would have arrived at the opposite conclusion, holding that there was no infringement. However, because the
case revolved around the use of a competitor’s metatag, it should not have been
actionable in the first place. Also in the Internet context, the Beanie Babies case of
Ty, Inc. v. Agnes M., Ltd. 187 could have been resolved under the ACPA because the
facts seem to show that the defendant had a bad faith intent to profit from Ty,
Inc.’s goodwill by not only using the plaintiff’s mark in its domain name, but also
by using the plaintiff’s logo. 188
IV. CONCLUSION
Under the Lanham Act, trademark infringement occurs when there is a likelihood of confusion. Some courts have strayed away from this traditional standard
and have utilized initial interest confusion, even in situations such as Brookfield
where it is acknowledged that there is no likelihood of consumer confusion. Because it does not require a likelihood of confusion and because courts use the traditional factors anyway and can choose to emphasize the factor of consumer confusion when public health is at stake, this doctrine is inappropriate, unnecessary, and
inefficient. Furthermore, it wrongly limits consumer access to legitimate information. Although courts may wish to find infringement based on initial interest confusion in order to discourage bad actors from misappropriating another’s goodwill,
they should reach their goal via the direct application of the traditional standard.
In the Internet context, courts should acknowledge that metatags are an outdated issue because search engines do not use them in their relevancy algorithms.
Additionally, Congress has passed the ACPA, which is a better alternative to the
likelihood of confusion standard in domain name cases. As for future manipulative practices online, so long as they do not lead to a likelihood of confusion of the
relevant consumer, such practices should be allowed and sellers will be incentivized to educate consumers about those practices.
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